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Abstract
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by
agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns—either by avoiding reporting
some of them (understating), or by reporting additional ones that do not exist (overstating).
Each agent’s objective is to maximize, within the items chosen for inclusion in the knapsack,
the total valuation of her own chosen items. The knapsack problem, in this context, seeks
to minimize the worst-case approximation ratio for social welfare at equilibrium. We show
that a randomized greedy mechanism has attractive strategic properties: in general, it has a
correlated price of anarchy of 2 (subject to a mild assumption). For overstating-only agents,
it becomes strategyproof; we also provide a matching lower bound of 2 on the (worst-case)
approximation ratio attainable by randomized strategyproof mechanisms, and show that no
deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide any constant approximation ratio. We also
deal with more specialized environments. For the case of 2 understating-only agents, we provide
a randomized strategyproof 5+4
√
2
7
≈ 1.522-approximate mechanism, and a lower bound of
5
√
5−9
2
≈ 1.09. When all agents but one are honest, we provide a deterministic strategyproof
1+
√
5
2
≈ 1.618-approximate mechanism with a matching lower bound. Finally, we consider a
model where agents can misreport their items’ properties rather than existence. Specifically,
each agent owns a single item, whose value-to-size ratio is publicly known, but whose actual
value and size are not. We show that an adaptation of the greedy mechanism is strategyproof
and 2-approximate, and provide a matching lower bound; we also show that no deterministic
strategyproof mechanism can provide a constant approximation ratio.
1 Introduction
In the classical knapsack problem, given a set of items, where each item has a certain size and value,
the objective is to choose a subset of those items in order to maximize total value subject to a total
size constraint. However, there are applications of the knapsack problem where the data regarding
the items is not simply available, but rather is privately held by agents who can manipulate the
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data in order to advance their own goals. For example, consider scheduling MRI appointments at a
hospital on a given day. Each patient has some required scan duration, and derives a certain utility
from it, which represents the health benefit from her scan. The hospital would naturally like to
maximize the total utility subject to the time the MRI machine is available during the day. However,
the hospital consists of many doctors (or alternatively departments), each is concerned with the
benefit of their own patients. Thus, if a doctor believes she can increase her patients’ total utility by
not ordering some necessary but less urgent scans, or by booking some unnecessary (but harmless)
scans, she might do so. It may seem counterintuitive that such manipulation could be beneficial
to the doctor’s patients, but as we will see, it can be quite beneficial to them and quite harmful
to the welfare of the other patients. It should be noted that manipulation due to selfish behavior
in the healthcare system is a real problem. One example concerns transplant centers/hospitals
withholding information (hiding patients) from kidney exchange programs in order to increase the
number of transplants performed locally or the number of their own patients getting a kidney
[3, 11, 2]. Another example is the influence of financial interests on ordering medical tests and
performing medical procedures [7, 14].
Following the above discussion, we consider a variant of the knapsack problem, which we will
now informally discuss (formal definitions are given in Section 2). In our variant, the items are
owned by a set of agents (every item is owned by a unique agent, but an agent may own multiple
items). A mechanism designer needs to choose a solution, namely a subset of the items with total
size less than or equal the knapsack’s capacity. The designer would “like” to choose a solution
which maximizes the total value. However, each agent’s set of items is private information known
only to that agent, and reported to the designer by her. Furthermore, each agent is a selfish
utility maximizer, and gets a utility equal to the value of her own items chosen for inclusion in the
knapsack, that is the total value of the intersection between her (true) set of items and the solution.
To maximize her utility, each agent can misreport her set of items. Specifically, an agent can avoid
reporting some of her existing items, as well as reporting fake items which she does not actually
own (she will derive no direct value from a fake item being chosen, but reporting it might increase
the total value of her chosen true items).1 Due to this, we cannot simply assume the agents will
report truthfully. Consider the following example:
Example 1. Consider the case where the mechanism designer always chooses the optimal solution
1In most of our paper, we take a somewhat untraditional approach by having the manipulated information being
the existence of the items rather than their properties, such as values and sizes. Nevertheless, this approach exists
in other problems as well. For example, the manipulation done by transplant centers in kidney exchange problems
[2] is of this type; another example can be found in [8]. In the particular example of MRI, doctors not being able to
manipulate the value of a scan might stem, for example, from the value being unrelated to medical considerations,
and simply represent the time the agent has been waiting for a scan. Alternatively, it could stem from having a
central authority that determines the medical value of a scan, but—due to the large number of patients—does not
evaluate patients in advance, but rather relies on the doctors to report the need for a scan. The latter is particularly
likely if the machine is externally and publicly owned, and receives requests for scans from private hospitals.
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to the knapsack problem based on the reports. Define the following instances of our problem. In all
these instances, the knapsack’s capacity is 1, and there are two agents. The items in our instances
will be taken from the following four: items a, b and c, each of value 34 and size
1
2 , and item d, of
value and size 1.
1. Instance 1: agent 1 owns item a, agent 2 owns items c and d. The optimal solution is to
include items a and c in the knapsack.
2. Instance 2: agent 1 owns item a, agent 2 owns item d. The optimal solution is to include
item d in the knapsack.
3. Instance 3: agent 1 owns items a and b, agent 2 owns item d. The optimal solution is to
include items a and b in the knapsack.
If the true instance is 1, agent 2 has an incentive to not report item c. In this situation, the
optimal solution to instance 2 will be chosen, which increases agent 2’s utility from 34 to 1. If, on
the other hand, the true instance is 2, agent 1 has an incentive to report that she also owns item
b. In this case, the solution to instance 3 would be chosen. While agent 1 will derive no benefit
from the inclusion of item b in the solution, she will derive benefit from the inclusion of item a in
it, increasing her utility from 0 to 34 .
Due to the strategic nature of the problem, we will be looking for mechanisms that achieve
“good” results, in some sense, in game-theoretic equilibrium. We will be considering two kinds of
equilibria: dominant strategy equilibrium, where no agent can benefit from reporting differently
regardless of the reports of the other agents, and Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE), where no agent
can benefit from reporting differently if no other agent reports differently. Generally, achieving
optimality at equilibrium will not be possible, and so we will be looking for mechanisms that
approximate optimality well. Specifically, we will be looking for mechanisms that, at equilibrium,
provide a small worst-case approximation ratio.
Our paper is part of a growing literature on the subject of approximate mechanism design
without money, which originated in a paper by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [15]. This approach
has been applied to many types of problems, such as matching [8], facility location [1, 10, 9], cake
cutting [13] and kidney exchange [2]. The most relevant paper we could find is by Chen et al. [6].
In (part of) their paper, they consider what we call in our paper the “understating model” (where
agents cannot report non-existent items), but there is no overlap in their results and ours. They
provide a randomized strategyproof mechanism in that model, but at a great cost to the quality of
approximation. Also related is the “Funding Games” model of Bar-Noy et al. [4]. In that problem,
the objective is again to maximize the total value of the chosen items, but the agents wish to
maximize the size of their chosen items. They provide a 2-approximate mechanism for a setting in
which each agent reports one of her items, specifically its true size and a lower bound on its value.
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Table 1: Approximation Ratio Bounds for Strategyproof Mechanisms
Overstating Understat. (n = 2) Overstat. (1-bad-apple) KQUS
Rand. UB 2 5+4
√
2
7 ≈ 1.522
1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.618 2
Rand. LB 2 5
√
5−9
2 ≈ 1.09
5
√
5−9
2 ≈ 1.09 2
Det. UB – – 1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.618 –
Det. LB ∞ 1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.618
1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.618 ∞
Contributions. We provide positive and negative results for three models: the understating
model—where agents can hide items but cannot report fake ones, the overstating model—where
agents can report fake items but cannot hide items, and the full model—where agents can ma-
nipulate the data both by hiding items and reporting fake ones. We also consider two specialized
environments: a duopoly, i.e. when the number of agents is 2, and the one-bad-apple environment,
where all agents but one are assumed to be honest. In terms of BNE, we analyze a mechanism called
HALF-GREEDY and show that it provides a correlated price of anarchy of 2 in the understating
model ; this remains the case for the full model, under a mild assumption. In terms of dominant
strategy equilibria, we summarize our results in Table 1.
It is worth noting that our positive result for the overstating model is also due to the HALF-
GREEDY mechanism. We also show that HALF-GREEDY can be modified to be strategyproof
and 2-approximate in a different problem, ’Known Quality Unknown Size’ (KQUS), where each
agent owns a single item whose value-to-size ratio is publicly known, but its actual value and size
are not.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model and formal-
ize the above discussion. In Section 3, we discuss HALF-GREEDY and its strategic properties.
Sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to the specialized environments of a duopoly and one-bad-apple,
respectively. In Section 6, we provide some lower bounds on the approximation ratios strate-
gyproof mechanisms can accomplish; among other things, these lower bounds imply the optimality
of HALF-GREEDY in the overstating model, and the optimality of our specialized mechanism for
the case where all but one agent are honest. In Section 7, we consider KQUS. We show that an
adaptation of HALF-GREEDY is strategyproof and 2-approximate there, and provide a matching
lower bound; we also show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide a constant
approximation ratio. Finally, in Section 8 we propose directions for future research. In addition,
we provide some results and proofs omitted from the paper in the appendix.
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2 Model
Let C ∈ R+ be the knapsack’s capacity. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents, n ≥ 2. Each
agent i has a ground set of items Gi (informally, the set of items agent i can potentially own).
Each item a ∈ Gi has size s(a) and value v(a) where s(a) ∈ (0, C] and v(a) ∈ (0,∞).
2 We assume
that Gi ∩ Gj = ∅ for i 6= j. In the special case where for every s ∈ (0, C], v ∈ (0,∞), Gi contains
infinitely many items of size s and value v (for each i ∈ N), we call the ground sets unrestricted.
For technical convenience, we assume the existence of a given total order3  on ∪i∈NGi. For a
set A, let us denote the collection of all finite subsets of A as Â. Every agent i has a finite true
set of items Xi ∈ Ĝi; also, let X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) be denoted as the true set profile. For each
agent i, let R∗i (Xi) ⊆ Ĝi be her report space when her true set of items is Xi. Unless otherwise
stated, we assume R∗i (Xi) = 2
Xi , a case we call the understating model (where agents can hide
items but cannot report fake ones); however, we will also consider the overstating model, where
R∗i (Xi) = {A ∈ Ĝi : Xi ⊆ A} (agents can report fake items but cannot hide items), and the full
model, where R∗i (Xi) = Ĝi (agents can perform both types of manipulations and hence are free
to report any set of items they want). Also, we call agent i honest if she is always truthful, that
is R∗i (Xi) = {Xi}. Thus, for example, if we say that a result applies in the understating model
with agents i, j ∈ N assumed honest, then we mean that the result applies when R∗i (Xi) = {Xi},
R∗j (Xj) = {Xj}, and for k ∈ N\{i, j}, R
∗
k(Xk) = 2
Xk .
A deterministic mechanism is a function f : Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn → ∪̂i∈NGi which maps the agents’
reports to a set of items to include in the knapsack. A randomized mechanism is a function from
Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn to all random variables with support in ∪̂i∈NGi. For any A ∈ ∪̂i∈NGi, we define
s(A) =
∑
a∈A s(a) and v(A) =
∑
a∈A v(a). Next, we define:
Definition 1. A deterministic (respectively, randomized) mechanism f is feasible iff for all R ∈
Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn:
1. The mechanism only uses the available items: f(R) ∈ ∪i∈NRi (respectively, surely).
2. The mechanism doesn’t violate the knapsack’s capacity: s(f(R)) ≤ C (respectively, surely).
In this paper, whenever we write ‘mechanism’, we mean feasible mechanism. For the rest of the
paper we assume without loss of generality the normalization C = 1. We define the utility that
agent i derives from S ∈ ∪̂i∈NGi when her true set is Xi to be u(Xi, S) = v(Xi∩S). We also define
2The fact that our formulation allows us to distinguish between items with identical size, value and owner is a
mere convenience. All of our results translate to a model where such items are indistinguishable (in such a model,
when reporting fake items is allowed, we assume that real items are chosen before fake ones in HALF-GREEDY; this
is justified by the view that the mechanism designer’s choice in this model is the number of spots qi,s,v to allocate to
agent i ∈ N for items of size s and value v, while agent i chooses which “specific” items to put in those spots).
3It is easily seen that our results can be rewritten without being given this order in advance, but having it simplifies
presentation as it eliminates the need for tie-breaking procedures which essentially decide such an order.
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the notation (z−i, z′i) = (z1, . . . , zi−1, z
′
i, zi+1, . . . , zn) for every i ∈ N and n-dimensional vector z.
Next, we define strategyproofness, which means that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for
each agent (no agent can benefit from misreporting).4
Definition 2. A deterministic (respectively, randomized) mechanism f is called strategyproof if for
all i ∈ N , X ∈ Ĝ1×· · ·× Ĝn, Ri ∈ R
∗
i (Xi), we have u(Xi, f(X)) ≥ u(Xi, f(X−i, Ri)) (respectively,
E[u(Xi, f(X))] ≥ E[u(Xi, f(X−i, Ri))]).
The social welfare obtained when the chosen solution is S ∈ ∪̂i∈NGi and the true set profile
is X ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn is sw(S,X) =
∑n
i=1 u(Xi, S) = v(S ∩ (∪i∈NXi)). Informally speaking,
the designer would like to choose S that maximizes this objective function, but as we saw in Ex-
ample 1, always doing so generally violates strategyproofness. Instead, the mechanism designer’s
objective is to minimize the worst-case approximation ratio; for a deterministic (respectively, ran-
domized) mechanism, it means to minimize max
X∈Ĝ1×···×Ĝn
∑n
i=1 u(Xi,OPT (∪i∈NXi))∑n
i=1 u(Xi,f(X))
(respectively,
max
X∈Ĝ1×···×Ĝn
∑n
i=1 u(Xi,OPT (∪i∈NXi))∑n
i=1 E[u(Xi,f(X))]
), where OPT (A) is an optimal solution to the knapsack
problem when the set of available items is A (in a non-strategic environment).5 Thus, our goal is to
find deterministic and randomized mechanisms which are strategyproof, and subject to that, have
as small as possible worst-case approximation ratios. If a mechanism has worst-case approximation
ratio less than or equal to α, we say that the mechanism is α-approximate.
Finally, one of the mechanisms we provide is not strategyproof in some of our models, but still
has attractive strategic properties in terms of Bayes-Nash Equilibria (BNE). Thus, we state the
required definitions here. Assume X˙ is a random variable over Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn with probability
distribution F . A strategy R˜i of agent i is a function from Ĝi to the space of all random variables
over Ĝi, such that R˜i(X˙i) ∈ R
∗
i (X˙i) surely. For convenience of notation, we make the dependence
on X˙i implicit and define agent i’s report to be R˙i = R˜i(X˙i). We say that a strategy profile R˜ is
a BNE under mechanism f and probability distribution F if no agent has a beneficial unilateral
deviation, meaning that there does not exist agent i ∈ N and strategy R˜′i such that E[u(X˙i, f(R˙))] <
E[u(X˙i, f(R˙−i, R˙′i))].
6 We say that a BNE R˜ is α-approximate if
∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,OPT (∪i∈NX˙i))]∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,f(R˙))]
≤ α. If,
for a given mechanism f , for all probability distributions F over Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn, every BNE is
α-approximate, we say that f has a correlated price of anarchy α (as defined in [16]).
4The revelation principle in mechanism design tells us that any result that can be achieved in dominant strategy
equilibrium can also be realized via strategyproof mechanisms [12], so in the search for such equilibria we can restrict
ourselves to strategyproof mechanisms without loss of generality.
5In case there is more than one optimal solution, choose one arbitrarily.
6Note that there is no need to separate the definitions of deterministic and randomized mechanisms in this case,
as expectation is taken in both cases—in the randomized case there is just an extra random variable determined by
f .
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3 The HALF-GREEDY Mechanism
In this section, we analyze the strategic properties of a randomized mechanism we call HALF-
GREEDY. In the overstating model, we show that HALF-GREEDY is strategyproof and 2-approximate.
In the understating model, we show that while HALF-GREEDY is not strategyproof, it has a cor-
related price of anarchy of 2. In the full model, we can preserve a correlated price of anarchy of 2,
under a mild additional assumption. In Section 6, we obtain some lower bounds for the overstating
model, which imply the optimality of HALF-GREEDY among randomized strategyproof mecha-
nisms in that model, and also show that randomization is necessary for obtaining any constant
worst-case approximation ratio.
To define HALF-GREEDY, we need two auxiliary mechanisms. The first one is the GREEDY
mechanism, which adds items to the knapsack by decreasing value-to-size ratio, breaking ties accord-
ing to . It will be convenient to define ′ to be a total order on ∪i∈NGi, where for a, b ∈ ∪i∈NGi,
if v(a)
s(a) >
v(b)
s(b) , then a ≻
′ b, and if v(a)
s(a) =
v(b)
s(b) , then 
′ agrees with .
Definition 3. For every A ∈ ∪̂i∈NGi, and every b ∈ A, let the set of items (in A) strictly larger
than b under ′ be defined as LA(b) = {a ∈ A : a ≻′ b}; if s(A) > 1, let the first item left out
of the knapsack be defined as oA = max′{b ∈ A : s(LA(b) ∪ {b}) > 1}. Let the reported items be
R ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn. Define the GREEDY mechanism GR as follows: if s(∪i∈NRi) ≤ 1, return
∪i∈NRi, otherwise return L∪i∈NRi(o∪i∈NRi).
The second auxiliary mechanism is MAXIMUM-VALUE, which returns a single item with the
maximum value possible, breaking ties according to :
Definition 4. Let the reported items be R ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn. Define the MAXIMUM-VALUE
mechanism MV as follows: if ∪i∈NRi = ∅ return ∅, and otherwise return max{a ∈ ∪i∈NRi :
v(a) ≥ v(b) ∀b ∈ ∪i∈NRi}.
Now we can define HALF-GREEDY:
Definition 5. The HALF-GREEDY mechanism HG runs GREEDY with probability 12 and MAXIMUM-
VALUE with probability 12 (the probabilities are chosen independently of the input).
GREEDY and MAXIMUM-VALUE are trivially feasible, and hence so is HALF-GREEDY. It is
well known that HALF-GREEDY is 2-approximate (this is proven via a simple linear programming
based argument, see [5]).
For every set A ∈ ∪̂i∈NGi, we define XA to be the unique set profile where A = ∪i∈NXAi . The
following lemma shall be useful for our purposes:
Lemma 1. Let A,B,C ∈ ∪̂i∈NGi, and assume B ⊆ A, C∩A ⊆ B. Then, C∩HG(XA) ⊆ HG(XB)
surely (that is, every item in C that is included in the knapsack when we run MV /GR on XA
remains in the knapsack when we run them on XB).
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Proof. Let c ∈ C ∩MV (XA); note that by feasibility of MV , c ∈ A and hence c ∈ C ∩A, implying
c ∈ B. Now, by definition of MV , we have that c = max{a ∈ A : v(a) ≥ v(b) ∀b ∈ A}. Since
B ⊆ A and c ∈ B, we have that c = max{a ∈ B : v(a) ≥ v(b) ∀b ∈ B} (as c is maximal in the
larger set, it remains maximal in the smaller set), so c ∈MV (XB).
Now, let d ∈ C ∩ GR(XA); by feasibility of GR, d ∈ A, hence d ∈ C ∩ A, hence d ∈ B. If
s(B) ≤ 1, then GR(XB) = B, and in particular d ∈ GR(XB). So assume s(B) > 1, and note that
this implies s(A) > 1. Clearly, oA 
′ oB ; since d ∈ GR(XA) = LA(oA), d ≻′ oA ′ oB. Since d ∈ B
and d ≻′ oB, then d ∈ LB(oB), so d ∈ GR(XB).
From this lemma, we can deduce two corollaries. The first corollary states that if an agent hides
items in HALF-GREEDY, she does not hurt the other agents; all the items of the other agents that
were included in the knapsack before she hid items, remain included in the knapsack after.
Corollary 1. Let i ∈ N , Yi, Zi ∈ Ĝi, Yi ⊆ Zi. Then for every (R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , Rn),
(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝi−1 × Ĝi+1 × · · · × Ĝn, for all j ∈ N\{i}, Xj ∩
HG(R−i, Zi) ⊆ HG(R−i, Yi) surely (and thus E[u(Xj ,HG(R−i, Yi))] ≥ E[u(Xj ,HG(R−i, Zi))]).
Proof. Apply Lemma 1 with C = Xj, B = Yi ∪ (∪k∈N\{i}Rk) and A = Zi ∪ (∪k∈N\{i}Rk).
The second corollary states that an agent cannot benefit from reporting fake items:
Corollary 2. Let i ∈ N , X ∈ Ĝ1×· · ·× Ĝn and Ri ∈ Ĝi.Then Xi∩HG(X−i, Ri) ⊆ HG(X−i, Ri∩
Xi) surely (and thus E[u(Xi,HG(X−i, Ri ∩Xi))] ≥ E[u(Xi,HG(X−i, Ri))]).
Proof. Apply Lemma 1 with C = Xi, B = (Ri∩Xi)∪(∪j∈N\{i}Xj) and A = Ri∪(∪j∈N\{i}Xj).
Next, we will use the corollaries above to analyze the strategic properties of HALF-GREEDY.
We begin by noting that Corollary 2 guarantees strategyproofness in the overstating model:
Corollary 3. In the overstating model, HG is strategyproof and 2-approximate.
Proof. Strategyproofness is immediate from Corollary 2, since for every agent i and for every
possible report Ri ⊇ Xi in the overstating model, Ri ∩Xi = Xi. The fact that the mechanism is
2-approximate is already known, as noted above.
It is important to note that once the GREEDY mechanism first fails in adding an item to the
knapsack, it stops and returns the items currently in the knapsack; it does not try to add to the
knapsack the next item in the ordering that fits in the remaining space. This seemingly trivial
choice is actually crucial for maintaining strategyproofness, as the example below shows. Thus,
one must be careful about choices that are seemingly unimportant for optimization, as they may
be important for strategic properties.
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ALGORITHM 1: BAD-GREEDY
Input: a set A ∈ ∪̂i∈NGi
S ← ∅, T ← A
while T 6= ∅ do
next← max′ T
if s(S ∪ {next}) ≤ 1 then
S ← S ∪ {next}
end
end
return S
Example 2. Consider the mechanism BAD-GREEDY BG, defined as Algorithm 1. Consider the
case of n = 2, with X1 = {a}, X2 = {b}, v(a) = s(a) = 1, v(b) =
1
4 , s(a) =
1
2 ; on this instance,
BG(X) = {a}, and the utility of agent 2 is v(X2∩{a}) = 0. However, if agent 2 reports R2 = {b, c},
where v(c) = 1, s(c) = 12 (that is, agent 2 reports a fake item c in addition to her true item b),
then BG(X1, R2) = {b, c}, and agent 2’s utility is v(X2 ∩{b, c}) =
1
4 . Thus, BAD-GREEDY is not
strategyproof in the overstating model (assuming a ∈ G1, b, c ∈ G2).
When agents can hide items HG is no longer strategyproof, but it still has attractive strategic
properties in terms of Bayes-Nash equilibria.7 Note that HG is prior independent, meaning that
the designer does not need to know the probability distribution of X˙ in order to run it. Let us look
into its performance in the understating model:
Theorem 1. In the understating model, HALF-GREEDY has a correlated price of anarchy of 2.
Proof. Fix agent i ∈ N . Let X˙ be a random variable over Ĝ1×· · ·×Ĝn with probability distribution
F . Let R˜ be a BNE under mechanism HG and probability distribution F . Note that since we are
in the understating model, R˙j ⊆ X˙j surely for every j ∈ N (reminder: R˙j = R˜j(X˙j)). Thus, we
can apply Corollary 1 n − 1 times to deduce E[u(X˙i,HG(X˙))] ≤ E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙−i, X˙i))]; that is,
when all agents other than i hide items, agent i’s utility weakly increases. Now, by definition of
BNE, E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙−i, X˙i))] ≤ E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙))] (when all agents other than i play according to
R˜, i’s optimal response is to play R˜i). Thus, we have that E[u(X˙i,HG(X˙))] ≤ E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙))].
As i was chosen arbitrarily, this holds for all agents, and so we have that
∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,HG(X˙))] ≤∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙))].
Now, as we noted, HG is 2-approximate, which means that
∑n
i=1 u(X˙i,OPT (∪j∈N X˙j))∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,HG(X˙))]
≤ 2 for any
fixed X˙, which implies
∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,OPT (∪j∈NX˙j))]∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,HG(X˙))]
≤ 2 (in the latter case, the expectation is taken
over X˙ as well). Thus, we have that
∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,OPT (∪j∈NX˙j))]∑n
i=1 E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙))]
≤ 2 as well.
7For example, consider the case of n = 2, whereX1 = {a, b}, X2 = {c, d}, v(a) = 2, v(c) = 2−ǫ, s(a) = s(c) =
1
4
+ǫ,
v(b) = 3 − ǫ, v(d) = 3, s(b) = s(d) = 1
2
, where ǫ > 0 is very small. It is easy to check that there are no dominant
strategies in this case, truthful or not.
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Next, we consider the full model. In the full model we “almost” have a correlated price of
anarchy of 2. The reason we say “almost” is indifference: in BNE, an agent might report fake
items in a way that does not change her utility, but decreases other agents’ utilities. Let us give an
example of such a Nash equilibrium, which is a special case of BNE when there is no private data
(that is, when each X˙i equals a certain given set of items surely):
Example 3. Consider the case of n = 2 agents, X1 = {a}, X2 = {b}, where v(a) = 1, s(a) =
1
M
,
v(b) = M − 2, s(b) = M−1
M
, where M is some large integer, M >> 2. Truthful reporting is a
Nash equilibrium. Note that when agents report truthfully, HG chooses a with probability 12 and b
with probability 1. However, if agent 1 reports R1 = {a, c} where v(c) = M − 1 and s(c) =
M−1
M
,
and agent 2 reports truthfully, we still get a Nash equilibrium, in which HG still chooses a with
probability 12 , but b is chosen with probability 0 (c is chosen with probability 1, but since it is a fake
item, it does not add to the agents’ utilities or to the objective function value). In the latter Nash
equilibrium, the approximation ratio is 2M − 2.
Corollary 2 tells us that an agent can never benefit from reporting fake items, so in a way the
above can be viewed as a technicality. We shall get around that technicality by assuming that
agents are not malicious.
Definition 6. Let i ∈ N , Xi, Ri ∈ Ĝi. Ri is called a malicious report for agent i with true set of
items Xi if there exists R
′
i ∈ Ĝi where for all (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Ĝ1×· · ·×Ĝi−1×Ĝi+1×
· · ·×Ĝn, and all j ∈ N , E[u(Xj ,HG(X−i, Ri))] ≤ E[u(Xj ,HG(X−i, R′i))], with the inequality being
strict for at least one agent in at least one instance.
A strategy R˜i is called malicious if there exists Yi ∈ Ĝi so that the probability that R˜i(Yi) is
malicious (for i when her true set of items is Yi) is nonzero.
In other words, a malicious report is a report that can never benefit any agent (including the
agent reporting it), and can sometimes hurt an agent. Thus, if the agents are even very mildly
altruistic, they would not report maliciously.8 Next, we show an important property of non-
malicious reports: fake items included in those reports have no impact on the true items included
in the solution. The following lemma proves a special case of this claim, which limits all agents but
one to report truthfully; the general claim is then proven as a corollary.
Lemma 2. Let i ∈ N , Xi, Ri ∈ Ĝi. If Ri is not malicious for agent i with true set of items Xi,
then for every choice of (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝi−1× Ĝi+1× · · · × Ĝn, and for
every j ∈ N , we have that Xj ∩HG(X−i, Ri) = Xj ∩HG(X−i, Ri ∩Xi) surely.
8If we want, we can instead assume that an agent’s objective is lexicographic, where she first attempts to maximize
the value of her own items in the knapsack, and then, subject to that, also tries to maximize social welfare; in that
case, a malicious strategy is a weakly dominated strategy. Thus, not reporting maliciously is implied by not playing
weakly dominated strategies, so in this model we can replace the assumption of no malicious reporting by no weakly
dominated strategies being played and still get a correlated price of anarchy of 2.
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Proof. Assume that there exists (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝi−1 × Ĝi+1 × · · · × Ĝn
such that Xj ∩MV (X−i, Ri) 6= Xj ∩MV (X−i, Ri ∩Xi) for some j ∈ N (the proof for GR instead
of MV is identical).
First, note that for every instance where the true set of items for agent i is Xi, and for
any fixed reports for the agents in N\{i}, reporting Ri ∩ Xi instead of Ri weakly increases
all agents’ utilities (agent i by Corollary 2, and the rest by Corollary 1). Thus, it is enough
to show that on our instance, when all k ∈ N\{i} own and report Xk, reporting Ri ∩ Xi in-
stead of Ri strictly increases some agent’s utility (since then Ri would be malicious). Corollaries
2 and 1 imply that u(Xk,MV (X−i, Ri ∩ Xi)) ≥ u(Xk,MV (X−i, Ri)) and u(Xk, GR(X−i, Ri ∩
Xi)) ≥ u(Xk, GR(X−i, Ri)) for all k ∈ N . By Corollary 1 if j 6= i and Corollary 2 if j = i,
Xj ∩MV (X−i, Ri) 6= Xj ∩MV (X−i, Ri∩Xi) implies Xj∩MV (X−i, Ri) ⊂ Xj ∩MV (X−i, Ri∩Xi),
thus u(Xj ,MV (X−i, Ri ∩Xi)) > u(Xj ,MV (X−i, Ri)). Thus our proof is complete.
Corollary 4. Let i ∈ N , Xi, Ri ∈ Ĝi. If Ri is not malicious for agent i with true set of items
Xi, then for every choice of (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), (R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Ĝ1×· · ·×
Ĝi−1× Ĝi+1× · · · × Ĝn, and for every j ∈ N , we have that Xj ∩HG(R) = Xj ∩HG(R−i, Ri ∩Xi)
surely.
Proof. Let (R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , Rn), (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝi−1 × Ĝi+1 ×
· · · × Ĝn. If Ri is non-malicious, then by Lemma 2 we know that for all j ∈ N , Rj ∩ HG(R) =
Rj ∩HG(R−i, Ri∩Xi) surely. Intersecting both sides with Xj yields Xj ∩Rj ∩HG(R) = Xj ∩Rj ∩
HG(R−i, Ri∩Xi) surely. By feasibility of HG, we have Xj ∩HG(R) ⊆ Rj and Xj ∩HG(R−i, Ri∩
Xi) ⊆ Rj ; thus it follows that Xj ∩HG(R) = Xj ∩HG(R−i, Ri ∩Xi)
We can now describe the sense in which the correlated price of anarchy of 2 is preserved:
Theorem 2. In the full model, any BNE under HG in which no malicious strategies are played is
2-approximate.
Proof. Let X˙ be a random variable over Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn with probability distribution F . Let R˜
be a BNE under mechanism HG and probability distribution F , and assume that no malicious
strategies are being played in R˜. For convenience, define R˙ ∩ X˙ = (R˙1 ∩ X˙1, . . . , R˙n ∩ X˙n), and let
R˜ ∩ X˙ the strategy profile generating those reports. Applying Corollary 4 n times in succession,
once for each agent, to get from R˙ to R˙ ∩ X˙, we can immediately conclude that every agent gets
the exact same utility under R˙ and R˙ ∩ X˙. If R˜ ∩ X˙ is a BNE in the full model, then since no
fake items are reported, it is clearly also a BNE in the understating model, and hence by Theorem
1 it is 2-approximate, and therefore R˜ is 2-approximate as well. Thus, it is enough to show that
R˜ ∩ X˙ is a BNE in the full model.
Fix agent i. Apply Corollary 4 n− 1 times to get that for all Yi ∈ Ĝi, E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙−i, Yi))] =
E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙ ∩ X˙−i, Yi))]; thus, it follows that since R˙i is a best response by agent i when all
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other agents j play R˙j , it remains a best response when they all play R˙j ∩ X˙j instead. Also, by
Corollary 2, agent i weakly benefits from playing R˙i ∩ X˙i instead of R˙i, so R˙i ∩ X˙i is also a best
response to all other agents j playing R˙j ∩ X˙j . Thus, R˜ ∩ X˙ is a BNE in the full model.
As we noted in the proof above, a BNE in the full model in which no fake items are reported
is trivially a BNE in the understating model. However, it is not trivial that every BNE in the
understating model remains a BNE in the full model. Below we show that it is in fact the case, so
no BNE are lost when moving from the understating model to the full model.
Theorem 3. Let R˜ be a BNE in under HG and distribution F in the understating model; then it
remains such a BNE in the full model.
Proof. Assume R˜ is not a BNE in the full model. Then there must exist an agent i and strat-
egy R˜′i where E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙))] < E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙−i, R˙
′
i))]. But, by Corollary 2, this implies that
E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙))] < E[u(X˙i,HG(R˙−i, R˙′i ∩ X˙i))], and since R˙
′
i ∩ X˙i ⊆ X˙i surely, it follows that R˜
is not a BNE in the understating model.
To conclude our discussion on BNE in this section, we note that if we assume that G1, . . . , Gn are
finite, the existence of a (2-approximate) BNE in the understating model (and hence, by Theorem
3, also in the full model) is guaranteed by Nash’s Theorem, and all of our results so far still hold.
4 The EQUAL-UTILITY Mechanism
In this section, we consider the special case of n = 2 in the understating model. We design
a specialized randomized mechanism for this environment, which is strategyproof and 5+4
√
2
7 ≈
1.522-approximate. We note that in Section 6, we provide a lower bound of 5
√
5−9
2 ≈ 1.09 for
randomized strategyproof mechanisms in the understating model, even when n = 2; thus, if we
want strategyproofness, some approximation gap is necessary. Also in Section 6, we show that no
deterministic strategyproof mechanism can beat our mechanism’s approximation ratio.
Informally, the idea behind EQUAL-UTILITY, shown as Algorithm 2, is to consider OPT (X1)
and OPT (X2), namely the optimal solutions using just a single agent’s items. Let’s say we wish
for EQUAL-UTILITY to be α-approximate. If OPT (Xi) is significantly bigger than OPT (Xj),
to the extent where OPT (Xi) is guaranteed to be an α-approximation on its own to the optimal
value, then we simply return OPT (Xi). Otherwise, we have some indication that the two agents’
“importance” in creating approximately optimal solutions is relatively close. In that case, we
consider the following mathematical program (PROGRAM), where A is a random decision variable
(set of items): maximize v(A), subject to (1) A ⊆ X1 ∪X2 and s(A) ≤ 1 surely and (2) E[v(A ∩
X1)] = E[v(A ∩X2)].
9
9PROGRAM can be stated as a linear programming problem with exponentially many variables. Let T = {S ⊆
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ALGORITHM 2: EQUAL-UTILITY
Input: Sets of items X1, X2, where Xi ∈ Ĝi; parameter α ∈ [1, 2)
Z1 ← OPT (X1), Z2 ← OPT (X2)
if v(Zi) ≥
1
α
(v(Z1) + v(Z2)) for some i ∈ {1, 2} then
return Zi (option 1)
else
return optimal solution to PROGRAM with input X (option 2)
end
PROGRAM solves the knapsack problem with the additional constraint that the agents’ utilities
are equal. Since in general, apart from ∅, there might not be a deterministic solution that satisfies
this additional constraint, we allow for randomized solutions to the knapsack problem instead. The
important property of PROGRAM is that it aligns the strategic goals of the two agents: each agent
cares about the other’s success exactly as much as she does about her own, for their utilities are
equal. The fact that the agents’ “importance” is close makes the equal expected utility constraint
not too restricting, and causes this program to provide a good approximation to the optimal value.
We have used options 1 and 2 to denote the lines in which the algorithm can terminate. If not
both v(Z1) = v(Z2) = 0, note that since α < 2, there is no ambiguity in the conditional statement:
if there is a choice of i that satisfies the condition, it must be unique. If both v(Z1) = v(Z2) = 0,
then Z1 = Z2 = ∅, so which one is chosen does not matter.
Theorem 4. For α ≥ 5+4
√
2
7 ≈ 1.522, EQUAL-UTILITY is strategyproof and α-approximate.
Proof. First, we prove strategyproofness. We break the proof into cases:
1. Assume the mechanism ends at option 1. In that case, agent i clearly gets the best utility
she can possibly get, and hence has no incentive to misreport. Consider agent j 6= i. Assume
agent j reports X ′j ⊂ Xj. Let us denote Z
′
j = OPT (X
′
j). Note that v(Z
′
j) ≤ v(Zj). Since
v(Zi) ≥
1
α
(v(Zi) + v(Zj)), trivially v(Zi) ≥
1
α
(v(Zi) + v(Z
′
j)). Thus, agent j cannot prevent
the mechanism from ending at option 1 by misreporting. Furthermore, since at option 1 the
mechanism returns Zi, agent j has no influence on what is returned. Thus agent j cannot
change the outcome of the mechanism by misreporting.
2. Assume the mechanism ends at option 2. Consider agent 1 (the proof for agent 2 is identical).
Assume agent 1 reports X ′1 ⊂ X1. Let us denote Z
′
1 = OPT (X
′
1). Note that v(Z
′
1) ≤ v(Z1).
Since the mechanism did not end at option 1, we have that v(Z1) <
1
α
(v(Z1)+ v(Z2)), that is
(α − 1)v(Z1) < v(Z2), so (α − 1)v(Z
′
1) < v(Z2) and hence v(Z
′
1) <
1
α
(v(Z ′1) + v(Z2)). Thus,
agent 1 cannot make the mechanism stop at option 1 and return Z ′1, and therefore agent 1
X1 ∪X2 : s(S) ≤ 1}. Then PROGRAM can be stated as: maximize
∑
S∈T
v(S)pS subject to
∑
S∈T
v(S ∩X1)pS =
∑
S∈T
v(S ∩X2)pS,
∑
S∈T
pS = 1 and pS ≥ 0 for all S ∈ T (where the pS’s are our decision variables).
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cannot benefit from making the mechanism stop at option 1 (since if Z2 is returned, her payoff
is 0). At option 2, agent 1 would like to report all of her items: her utility is exactly half
of the optimal solution to PROGRAM, and so enlarging the feasible region of PROGRAM
weakly increases her own utility.
Next, we prove the mechanism is α-approximate. As v(Z1)+V (Z2) ≥ v(OPT (∪i∈{1,2}Xi)), if the
mechanism ends at option 1 clearly it provides an α-approximation.10 So we just need to prove this
for the case the mechanism ends at option 2. Let O = OPT (X1 ∪X2), O1 = O∩X1, O2 = O∩X2.
Let a = argmini∈{1,2} v(Oi), b = argmaxi∈{1,2} v(Oi) (if v(O1) = v(O2), set a = 1 and b = 2), and
let p = v(Ob)−v(Oa)
v(Ob)−v(Oa)+v(Za) . Consider the random variable A which returns Za with probability p and
O with probability (1 − p). p was chosen precisely so that A becomes a feasible solution to our
program: E[v(A∩Xb)] = (1−p)v(Ob) =
v(Ob)v(Za)
v(Ob)−v(Oa)+v(Za) =
(v(Ob)−v(Oa))v(Za)
v(Ob)−v(Oa)+v(Za)+
v(Oa)v(Za)
v(Ob)−v(Oa)+v(Za) =
pv(Za) + (1− p)v(Oa) = E[v(A ∩Xa)]. It is therefore enough to show that
v(O)
E[v(A)] ≤ α.
Note that v(O)
E[v(A)] =
v(Oa)+v(Ob)
(1−p)(v(Oa)+v(Ob))+pv(Za) =
(v(Oa)+v(Ob))(v(Ob)−v(Oa)+v(Za))
2v(Za)v(Ob)
. When v(Za) and
v(Ob) are fixed values, and v(Oa) is a variable, this is a parabola with a maximum at v(Oa) =
v(Za)
2 .
Plugging that in, we have the following upper bound on the approximation ratio:
(
v(Za)
2
+v(Ob))
2
2v(Za)v(Ob)
=
1
2 +
v(Ob)
2v(Za)
+ v(Za)8v(Ob) . Let us denote x =
v(Ob)
v(Za)
; then our upper bound is 12 +
x
2 +
1
8x . We know
that x = v(Ob)
v(Za)
≤ v(Zb)
v(Za)
< 1
α−1 (since the mechanism did not end at option 1). We also know that
x = v(Ob)
v(Za)
= 2v(Ob)2v(Za) ≥
v(Ob)+v(Oa)
2v(Za)
= v(O)2v(Za) ≥
1
2 . So, to see how bad our upper bound can be, we
maximize 12 +
x
2 +
1
8x over x ∈ [
1
2 ,
1
α−1 ]. Simple analysis shows that for α > 1, the maximum is
1
2 +
1
2(α−1) +
α−1
8 . We are therefore guaranteed approximation ratio α from our mechanism as long
as 12 +
1
2(α−1) +
α−1
8 ≤ α, which is easily seen to hold as long as α ≥
5+4
√
2
7 .
In the appendix, we show that 5+4
√
2
7 was not an overestimate—this is tight for EQUAL-
UTILITY. Finally, we note that EQUAL-UTILITY requires solving NP-hard problems: computing
OPT (X1) and OPT (X2) means solving the knapsack problem, which is known to be NP-hard. In
the appendix, we show that solving PROGRAM is NP-hard as well. Therefore, if running time is
a consideration, EQUAL-UTILITY might be insufficient.11
10It is worth noting that it is important to use v(Z1) + v(Z2) instead of v(OPT (X1 ∪ X2)) for the conditional
statement; using the latter would violate strategyproofness.
11We do have approximation algorithms for these NP-hard problems: there is a known FPTAS for knapsack
[17], and from the proof of Theorem 4 we can easily deduce an algorithm which produces 1
1−ǫ
α approximation to
PROGRAM in time polynomial in 1
ǫ
whenever EQUAL-UTILITY needs to solve it. The problem is that if we
use them, strategyproofness is technically violated in a strange fashion: for example, consider trying to compute
OPT (Xi). If Xi contains few items, the designer solves the problem optimally, but if Xi contains many items, then–
due to running time considerations– she solves it approximately. Thus, if Xi is large, agent i might be better off
only reporting the items included in the optimal solution, to avoid risking a suboptimal solution being chosen by the
approximation algorithm. Therefore, despite the fact that the goals of the agent and the designer are fully aligned
with each other in this case, the agent can potentially benefit from hiding all items except those in the optimal
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ALGORITHM 3: PACIFY-THE-LIAR
Input: Sets of items X1, . . . , Xn, where Xi ∈ Ĝi; parameter α ≥ 1
Z1 ← OPT (X1), Z2 ← OPT (∪i∈N\{1}Xi)
if v(Z1) ≥
1
α
(v(Z1) + v(Z2)) then
return Z1 (option 1)
else if v(Z2) ≥
1
α
v(OPT (∪i∈NXi)) then
return Z2 (option 2)
else
S ← {A ⊆ ∪i∈NXi : v(A) > αv(Z2)}
return argmaxA∈S v(A ∩X1) (option 3)
end
5 The PACIFY-THE-LIAR Mechanism
We continue exploring the understating model. We now allow for a general number of agents n,
however we restrict ourselves to an environment where there is only one bad apple—specifically,
n − 1 agents are assumed to be honest; we assume without loss of generality that agent 1 is
the manipulative agent.12 For this environment, we will provide a φ-approximate deterministic
strategyproof mechanism (φ = 1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.618 is the golden ratio). In Section 6 we provide a
matching lower bound.
Our deterministic mechanism, called PACIFY-THE-LIAR (Algorithm 3), begins similarly to
EQUAL-UTILITY in the sense that it attempts to see if agent 1 can guarantee an α-approximation
on her own, or if agents 2 through n can guarantee an α-approximation together, without agent
1. In the former case, we return OPT (X1), and in the latter case we return OPT (∪i∈N\{1}Xi). If
neither of the cases hold, we look at a collection of solutions that guarantee α-approximation, and
attempt to “pacify” agent 1 by choosing her favorite solution within that collection.
Note that if we reach option 3, S is nonempty since we did not stop at option 2 (thus S includes
the optimal solution).
Theorem 5. PACIFY-THE-LIAR is strategyproof and α-approximate for α ≥ φ.
solution. Nevertheless, if she does so, it is in an attempt to assist, rather than mislead, the designer by narrowing
down the search space. Informally speaking, these strange violations could be eliminated if we allow the designer to
“listen” to the agent’s solution proposals for such problems, and choose the best between her own computed solution
and the agent’s.
12Certainly, if the identity of the manipulative agent is public, assuming that it is agent 1 is without loss of generality.
Our results hold even if the honesty of an agent—whether or not that agent is manipulative—is private information
of that agent, if we naturally extend our definition of mechanism to allow reporting of all private data, including
honesty. Our lower bound will of course still hold. As for our upper bound, consider an augmented mechanism: if
exactly one agent reports that they are manipulative, run PACIFY-THE-LIAR accordingly; otherwise, return ∅. As
all the other agents answer that they are honest, it is easily seen that it is always weakly better for the manipulative
agent to reveal herself as dishonest.
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Proof. We begin by proving strategyproofness. If the algorithm ends at options 1 or 2, the proof
is similar to case (1) in the proof of Theorem 4. If the algorithm ends at option 3, the fact that
agent 1 cannot benefit from making the mechanism stop at an earlier option follows from a similar
argument to the one in case (2) in the proof of Theorem 4. Thus, all we need to show is that if the
mechanism stops at option 3 under agent 1’s misreport, agent 1 does not benefit. Assume X ′1 ⊂ X1
and let S′ = {A ⊆ X ′1 ∪ (∪i∈N\{1}Xi) : v(A) > αv(Z2)}. Then, note that S
′ ⊆ S, and for every
A ∈ S′, v(A ∩X ′1) = v(A ∩X1); therefore, maxA∈S′ v(A ∩X1) ≤ maxA∈S v(A ∩X1), and so agent
1 does not benefit.
Now that we have established strategyproofness, let us analyze the approximation ratio. Clearly
α-approximation is guaranteed when the mechanism ends at options 1 or 2. So let us consider the
case where the mechanism ends at option 3. Let A be the output. Since A ∈ S, v(A) > αv(Z2).
Since we did not stop at option 1, v(Z1) <
1
α−1v(Z2), and hence v(Z1) + v(Z2) <
α
α−1v(Z2).
Therefore, v(A) > αv(Z2) > (α − 1)(v(Z1) + v(Z2)) ≥ (α − 1)v(OPT (∪i∈NXi)). Thus, we are
guaranteed an α-approximate mechanism if 1
α
≤ (α − 1), and this is easily seen to hold true for
α ≥ φ.
Finally, we note that PACIFY-THE-LIAR, just like EQUAL-UTILITY, does not run in poly-
nomial time.
6 Lower Bounds
In this section we provide some lower bounds on the approximation ratios that strategyproof mech-
anisms can provide. Our lower bounds are robust—they all hold even when there are only two
agents and only one is manipulative. In some cases, our lower bounds match what our mechanisms
from the previous sections give us, proving their optimality. Throughout this section we assume
that the ground sets are unrestricted.
We begin with the overstating model.
Theorem 6. In the overstating model, there is no randomized strategyproof mechanism with a
worst-case approximation ratio strictly smaller than 2.
Proof. Let f be a randomized strategyproof mechanism with worst-case approximation ratio 1 <
r < 2 (the case of r = 1 has been covered in Example 1). Consider X′ ∈ Ĝ1 × · · · × Ĝn. In this
instance, X ′1 = {a1, . . . , aM2}, where v(aj) =
1
M
and s(aj) =
1
M2
for all j = 1, . . . ,M2; X ′2 = {b}
where v(b) = s(b) = 1; X ′i = ∅ for all i > 2, where M is some very large integer. The optimal
solution for this instance is X ′1, with optimal value M . If no item in X
′
1 is chosen with probability
strictly more than p, the approximation ratio is at least M
pM+(1−p) (note that choosing any items from
X ′1 excludes choosing b and vice versa), and thus we must have
M
pM+(1−p) ≤ r, namely p ≥
M−r
Mr−r .
Thus it must be the case that some item aj is chosen with probability at least q =
M−r
Mr−r .
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Next, consider X, which is identical to X′ except X1 = {aj}. In this instance, the optimal
solution is X2, with optimal value 1. Due to strategyproofness, it must be the case that item aj is
chosen with probability at least q (since otherwise agent 1 has an incentive to report X ′1 instead of
X1). Thus, the approximation ratio on this instance is at least
1
q
M
+(1−q) =
1
M−r
M2r−Mr
+Mr−M
Mr−r
. Sending
M →∞, this becomes r
r−1 > r for r ∈ (1, 2). Contradiction.
Thus, the theorem above shows that HALF-GREEDY is best possible in the overstating model.
Next, we show that randomization is necessary for good approximation:
Theorem 7. In the overstating model, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism with a
constant worst-case approximation ratio.
Proof. Let f be a deterministic strategyproof mechanism with worst-case approximation ratio r ∈
[1,∞). LetX′ be as in the proof of the previous theorem. AssumeM > r. If the mechanism doesn’t
choose any item in X ′1, the approximation ratio is at least
M
1 > r. Thus, the mechanism chooses
at least one item in X ′1, say aj . Now, consider X. On that profile, the mechanism must choose aj
due to strategyproofness, leading to an approximation ratio of 11
M
=M > r. Contradiction.
Next, we consider the understating model. We show that no deterministic strategyproof mecha-
nism can give an approximation ratio better than φ, thus proving the optimality of PACIFY-THE-
LIAR in its specialized environment (recall that all of our lower bounds hold when all agents but
one are honest). As this lower bound only uses 2 agents, it also shows that EQUAL-UTILITY’s
(in its specialized environment of n = 2) approximation ratio cannot be beaten by a deterministic
mechanism.
Theorem 8. In the understating model, no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide an
approximation ratio better than φ.
Proof. Let f be a deterministic strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio r < φ. Consider
the profile where X1 = {a} with s(a) = 1 and v(a) = φ, X2 = {b} with s(b) =
1
2 and v(a) = 1, and
Xi = ∅ for all i ≥ 3. To maintain approximation ratio r, we must have a ∈ f(X). Consider the
profile X′ that differs from X only in X ′1 = {a, c}, where s(c) =
1
2 and v(c) = φ− ǫ for some small
ǫ > 0. To maintain strategyproofness, we must have a ∈ f(X′). Thus, the approximation ratio on
that profile is φ−ǫ+1
φ
, which can be made arbitrarily close to φ+1
φ
= φ. Therefore, the worst-case
approximation ratio of f cannot be better than φ.
Finally, we show a lower bound of 5
√
5−9
2 ≈ 1.09 on the approximation ratio of randomized
strategyproof mechanisms in the understating model. The importance of this result is that it shows
that strategyproofness leads to a strict separation from optimality in the understating model, and
thus it is reasonable to look at approximation mechanisms there.
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Theorem 9. In the understating model, no randomized strategyproof mechanism can provide a
worst-case approximation ratio strictly better than 5
√
5−9
2 ≈ 1.09.
Proof. Let f be a randomized strategyproof mechanism which provides a worst-case approximation
ratio r < 5
√
5−9
2 . Consider the profile where X1 = {a} with s(a) = 1 and v(a) = φ =
1+
√
5
2 (the
golden ratio), X2 = {b} with s(b) =
1
2 and v(b) = 1, and Xi = ∅ for all i ≥ 3. Let p = P(a ∈ f(X)).
To maintain approximation ratio r, we must have (I) pφ + (1 − p) ≥ 1
r
φ. Now, consider profile
X′ = (X−1,X ′1) where X
′
1 = {a, c} and v(c) = 1, s(c) =
1
2 . Let p
′ = P(a ∈ f(X′)). To maintain
approximation ratio r, we must have (II) p′φ + (1 − p′)2 ≥ 2
r
. To maintain strategyproofness, we
must have (III) p′φ + (1 − p′) ≥ pφ. Now, (I) gives p ≥
φ
r
−1
φ−1 , (II) gives p
′ ≤ 2−
2
r
2−φ . (III) can be
rewritten as p′(φ − 1) + 1 − pφ ≥ 0, and so this implies 2−
2
r
2−φ (φ − 1) + 1 − φ
φ
r
−1
φ−1 ≥ 0. Isolating r,
this gives r ≥ 5
√
5−9
2 , contradiction.
We note that the fact that the golden ratio shows up in both the proofs of Theorems 8 and 9
was surprising to us, as in both cases we used general parameters and optimized for the maximal
lower bound. We wonder if there is a simple explanation for this.
7 Manipulating Sizes Instead of Existence
In this section, we consider a model which we call ‘Known Quality Unknown Size’ (KQUS). In this
model, the true item profile X is known, and in fact |Xi| = 1 for all i ∈ N ; hence, we simply call
agent i’s item ai and avoid using X. Furthermore, for each ai, ri =
v(ai)
s(ai)
is known, however v(ai)
and s(ai) themselves are private information of agent i. When r(ai) is given, s(ai) determines v(ai),
so we simply ask agent i to report s(ai). Agent i gets a utility of v(ai) if her item is chosen and 0
if not; note that her utility from ai being chosen is v(ai) even if she misreports. In this model the
“quality” of an item is known, but its indivisible value and size are not.
Formally, a deterministic mechanism in this model is a function f : R2n+ → 2
{a1,...,an}, which
maps (r, s) to a subset of the items to be included in the knapsack. We will require feasibility
(s(f(r, s)) ≤ 1) and strategyproofness (v(f(r, s) ∩ {ai}) ≥ v(f(r, (s−i, s′i)) ∩ {ai}) for all i ∈ N ,
s′i ∈ (0, 1]). We will also look for randomized strategyproof mechanisms. The adaptation is similar
to before: f is a random variable over 2{a1,...,an}, feasibility is s(f(r, s)) ≤ 1 surely, and strate-
gyproofness is E[v(f(r, s)∩{ai})] ≥ E[v(f(r, (s−i, s′i))∩{ai})]. For convenience of presentation, we
will allow items with zero value (all of our proofs can easily be adjusted to get rid such items).
In this model, while HALF-GREEDY is not strategyproof (specifically, MAXIMUM-VALUE is
not strategyproof), it can be easily modified to become strategyproof and remain 2-approximate—in
fact, the modified mechanism is also well known to be a 2-approximation in non-strategic environ-
ments [5]. ′ is defined as before.
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Definition 7. The NEXT mechanism is defined as follows: if s(∪i∈N{ai}) ≤ 1, return ∅, otherwise
return o∪i∈N{ai}
Definition 8. MODIFIED-HALF-GREEDY runs GREEDY with probability 12 and NEXT with
probability 12 .
MODIFIED-HALF-GREEDY still runs GREEDY with probability 12 , but otherwise it doesn’t
choose the item with the maximal value, but rather the first item to not make it into the knapsack
in GREEDY.
Theorem 10. In KQUS, MODIFIED-HALF-GREEDY is strategyproof and 2-approximate.
Proof. Fix agent j ∈ N . In MODIFIED-HALF-GREEDY, item aj is chosen with probability either
1
2 or 0. Specifically, an item is chosen with probability
1
2 iff it is in L∪i∈N{ai}(o∪i∈N{ai})∪{o∪i∈N{ai}}
(if s({a1, . . . , an}) ≤ 1, then all items are chosen with probability
1
2) . If item aj is chosen with
probability 12 , agent j has no incentive to manipulate. If item aj is chosen with probability 0,
then o∪i∈N{ai} ≻
′ aj, so s(aj) has no impact on what L∪i∈N{ai}(o∪i∈N{ai}) ∪ {o∪i∈N{ai}} is, and
thus agent j cannot make the item get chosen. So strategyproofness is proven. 2-approximation of
MODIFIED-HALF-GREEDY is, as we mentioned, known.
As in GREEDY, we made some careful choices here to preserve strategyproofness. Specifically,
the choice for NEXT to return ∅ when s(∪i∈N{ai}) ≤ 1, despite us being able to include all items
in the knapsack in that case, is crucial; if we indeed included all items in this case, strategyproofness
would have been violated.
Next, a matching lower bound:
Theorem 11. No randomized strategyproof mechanism can provide a worst-case approximation
ratio strictly better than 2 in KQUS.
Proof. Let f be a randomized strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio t < 2. Consider
the case where r1 = M , r2 = 1, and ri = 0 for i ≥ 3, where M is a large integer. Assume
s(a1) = 1 and s(a2) = 1. Let p1 be the probability with which item a1 is chosen under f . Then
p1M + (1− p1) ≥
1
t
M to maintain approximation ratio t, and therefore p1 ≥
M
t
−1
M−1 . Now, consider
the case where s(a1) =
1
M2
(the rest of the data remains the same), and let p′1 be the probability
that item a1 is chosen under f in this case. To maintain strategyproofness, we must have p1 = p
′
1.
Therefore, to maintain approximation ratio t, we must have p1
1
M
+ (1 − p1) ≥
1
t
, which yields
p1 ≤
1− 1
t
1− 1
M
. Therefore, we must have
1− 1
t
1− 1
M
≥
M
t
−1
M−1 , namely 1 +
1
M
≥ 2
t
. However, as M → ∞, the
left hand side goes to 1 and the right hand side remains 2
t
> 1. Contradiction.
Finally, we show that randomization is necessary for good approximation:
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Theorem 12. No deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide a constant worst-case ap-
proximation ratio in KQUS.
Proof. Let f be a deterministic strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio t. Consider the
case where r1 = M , r2 = 1, and ri = 0 for i ≥ 3, where M > t. Assume s(a1) = 1 and s(a2) = 1.
On this instance, to maintain approximation ratio t, f must choose {a1}. Now, consider the case
where s(a1) =
1
M2
(the rest of the data is the same). On this instance, to maintain approximation
ratio t, f must choose {a2}. Thus, when agent 1’s item is of size
1
M2
, she will have an incentive to
report its size to be 1, violating strategyproofness.
8 Future Research
There are several natural directions for the continuation of our research. First, all of our lower
bounds hold even when there are only two agents and only one is manipulative. It will be inter-
esting to know if having more manipulative agents necessarily increases the attainable worst-case
approximation ratio under strategyproofness. Second, we did not provide a strategyproof mech-
anism for the full model, and whether one with a constant approximation ratio exists is an open
problem. Third, we did not provide a strategyproof mechanism for the general understating model,
only for special cases of it; a randomized strategyproof mechanism with a very large approxima-
tion ratio is given in [6], but it is unclear whether a smaller approximation ratio is attainable.
Finally, the question of whether there exists a better randomized strategyproof mechanism than
EQUAL-UTILITY for 2 agents in the understating model is open, as our lower bound there is not
tight.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by CUNY Collaborative Incentive Research Grant (CIRG 21) 2153
and PSC-CUNY Research Award 67665-00 45. The authors would like to thank Jay Sethuraman
and Garud Iyengar for helpful discussions.
References
[1] Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Strategyproof
approximation of the minimax on networks. Math. Oper. Res., 35(3):513–526, 2010.
[2] Itai Ashlagi, Felix Fischer, Ian A Kash, and Ariel D Procaccia. Mix and match: A strategyproof
mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange. Games and Economic Behavior, 2013.
20
[3] Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E Roth. Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital
kidney exchange. Theoretical Economics, 9(3):817–863, 2014.
[4] Amotz Bar-Noy, Yi Gai, Matthew P Johnson, Bhaskar Krishnamachari, and George Rabanca.
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth. In Internet and Network Economics, pages
128–141. Springer, 2012.
[5] Edmund K Burke and Graham Kendall. Search methodologies. Springer, 2005.
[6] Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, and Pinyan Lu. Mechanism design without money via stable match-
ing. CoRR, abs/1104.2872, 2011.
[7] Tinglong Dai, Mustafa Akan, and Sridhar Tayur. Imaging room and beyond: The underlying
economics behind physicians test-ordering behavior in outpatient services. In 2011 MSOM,
Healthcare Operations Management Special Interest Group (SIG) Conference, 2012.
[8] Shaddin Dughmi and Arpita Ghosh. Truthful assignment without money. In 11th ACM
conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 325–334. ACM, 2010.
[9] Itai Feigenbaum, Jay Sethuraman, and Chun Ye. Approximately optimal mechanisms for
strategyproof facility location: Minimizing $l p$ norm of costs. CoRR, abs/1305.2446, 2013.
[10] Michal Feldman and Yoav Wilf. Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective.
In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 873–890.
ACM, 2013.
[11] Chen Hajaj, John P Dickerson, Avinatan Hassidim, Tuomas Sandholm, and David Sarne.
Strategy-proof and efficient kidney exchange using a credit mechanism. In AAAI, pages 921–
928, 2015.
[12] Jason D Hartline. Approximation in economic design. Book in preparation, 2012.
[13] Avishay Maya and Noam Nisan. Incentive compatible two player cake cutting. In Internet
and Network Economics, pages 170–183. Springer, 2012.
[14] Jean M Mitchell. Effect of physician ownership of specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgery
centers on frequency of use of outpatient orthopedic surgery. Archives of Surgery, 145(8):732–
738, 2010.
[15] Ariel D. Procaccia and Moshe Tennenholtz. Approximate mechanism design without money.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 1(4):18, 2013.
[16] Tim Roughgarden. The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. ACM Transac-
tions on Economics and Computation, 3(1):6, 2015.
21
[17] Vijay V Vazirani. Approximation algorithms. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
22
A APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide results and proofs that were omitted from the paper.
Theorem 13. Let r = 5+4
√
2
7 . For every δ > 0, there exist an instance where EQUAL-UTILITY
(with α = r) provides an approximation ratio strictly larger than r − δ.
Proof. Consider the profile where X1 = {a, b} with v(a) = s(a) = 1 and v(b) = s(b) =
1
2 , and
X2 = {c} where v(c) =
1
r−1 − ǫ where ǫ > 0 is small, and s(c) =
1
2 . EQUAL-UTILITY will reach
option 2 on this instance. In this case, item a is chosen with probability p =
1
r−1
−ǫ− 1
2
1
r−1
−ǫ+ 1
2
. Items b
and c are chosen with probability 1− p. The mechanism’s approximation ratio is
1
r−1
−ǫ+ 1
2
p+(1−p)( 1
r−1
−ǫ+ 1
2
)
,
which, as ǫ→ 0, goes to 5+4
√
2
7 .
Theorem 14. Solving PROGRAM is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove this by reduction from knapsack. Say we have an instance of the knapsack problem
with set of items I. Assume without loss of generality that the knapsack’s capacity in this instance
is 12 and that the sizes of the items are at most
1
2 each. Let an optimal solution be OPT
∗; we
want to know whether or not v(OPT ∗) ≥ k for some k > 0. Set X1 = I, and X2 = {a} where
v(a) = k and s(k) = 12 , and solve PROGRAM on this instance. Note that agent 2’s expected
utility can never surpass k, as she only has one item and its value is k. Thus, the optimal value of
PROGRAM is at most 2k, since the utilities must be equal. We claim that the optimal value of
PROGRAM is exactly 2k iff v(OPT ∗) ≥ k.
1. If v(OPT ∗) ≥ k, then there is a unique solution A to PROGRAM where A ∈ {OPT ∗ ∪
{a}, {a}} surely (as v(X1 ∩ (OPT
∗ ∪ {a})) = v(OPT ∗) ≥ k = v(X2 ∩ (OPT ∗ ∪ {a}))). Since
a is chosen with probability 1, agent 2 gets an expected utility of exactly k here, and hence
so does agent 1. Thus, E[v(A)] = 2k, and therefore the optimal value of PROGRAM is at
least 2k, and thus is exactly 2k.
2. If v(OPT ∗) < k, note that whenever S ⊆ X1∪X2 where v(S) ≤ 1, if a ∈ S, then v(S ∩X1) ≤
v(OPT ∗) < k (since if a ∈ S, there is only capacity 12 left for agent 1’s items). Thus, it follows
that for every solution A of PROGRAM, there is a nonzero probability that a /∈ A (otherwise
agent 1’s expected utility must be strictly less than k, and agent 2’s expected utility is exactly
k). Thus agent 2’s expected utility is strictly less than k, and therefore the optimal value of
PROGRAM is strictly less than 2k.
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